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A CASE FOR ALCOHOL BEVERAGE
WARNING LABELS: DUTY TO WARN
OF DANGERS OF CONSUMPTION
Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Alcoholic beverage manufacturers traditionally have enjoyed immunity
from civil liability despite the fact that alcoholism remains one of the most
prevalent and deadly diseases in the United States.' Courts consistently have
held that the public "generally knows" of the dangers of alcohol ingestion.3
Therefore, alcohol manufacturers have not had a legal duty to warn of the
dangerous propensities of their products.4 The Third Circuit decision in Hon v.
Stroh Brewery Co.5 is the first case in which a court found potential liability
for failure to warn of the dangerous propensities of liquor. It is now a jury
question in the Third Circuit whether plaintiffs injured by alcohol ingestion
will be able to recover under a theory of strict liability based on a finding that
an alcoholic beverage product was defective due to the absence of an adequate
warning. This Note will examine previous case law in which manufacturers
have enjoyed civil immunity, as well as the Third Circuit decision in Hon.
II. CASES GRANTING CIVIL IMMUNITY TO MANUFACTURERS
In previous product liability cases, courts held that manufacturers of alco-
holic beverages have no duty to warn of the danger of consuming alcoholic
beverages because such dangers are apparent and well-known.'
The Fourth Circuit, in Abernathy v. Schenley Industries, Inc.,7 was the
first circuit to decide that a cause of action against an alcohol beverage manu-
1. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
2. In 1985, the combined number of alcoholics and those suffering from the neg-
ative effects of alcohol use, age 18 years and older, was 17.7 million. In addition, alco-
hol accounts for approximately 97,500 deaths annually. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCO-
HOLISM PAMPHLET (available from the Washington, D.C. office).
3. See infra notes 14, 26, 39, 50 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Note, A Spirited Call to Require Alcohol Manufacturers to
Warn of the Dangerous Propensities of Their Products, 11 NOVA L. REv. 1611
(1987).
5. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
6. Annotation, Products Liability: Alcoholic Beverages, 42 A.L.R. 4TH 253, 261
(1985); see generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 559 (1969).
7. 556 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
1
Andreas: Andreas: Case for Alcohol Beverage Warning Labels
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
facturer should be dismissed if the beverage was neither mislabeled nor
"adulterated". 8 In Abernathy, the administrator of the estate of Eural Frank
Abernathy, who died of acute ethanol poisoning after drinking whiskey,
brought an action against the manufacturer, Schenley, and the seller, Meck-
lenburg Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control.9 The causes of action, which
alleged a violation of federal statutes 0 for failing to have labels warning of the
hazards of whiskey poisoning, were dismissed." The court of appeals, in af-
firming the dismissal by the district court, found that, where the whiskey is
neither misbranded nor adulterated, a distiller which complies with relevant
federal regulations as to official approval of its label on whiskey bottles has
met its labeling obligation under the statute. 2 Therefore, the manufacturer
was not liable for a death resulting from acute ethanol poisoning on the theory
that its labels failed to warn of the risk of such poisoning.' 3
A few years later, the Seventh Circuit in Garrison v. Heublein, Inc.,'4
held that a manufacturer and distributor of vodka did not have a duty to warn
consumers of the common "propensities" of alcohol ingestion. The plaintiffs
filed a complaint against Heublein, the manufacturer and distributor of
Smirnoff Vodka, alleging that Kenneth Garrison had suffered "physical and
mental injuries," including impairment to his physical and motor skills for pe-
riods after consumption, effects on the personality, addiction, and decreased
driving ability as a result of consuming Heublein's product over a twenty year
period.' 5
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged negli-
gence, willful and wanton conduct, products liability, fraud, and false and mis-
leading advertising.'6 The Garrison court found that, under Illinois law, sec-
tion 402(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 7 provided the analytical
8. Id. at 243-44.
9. Id. at 243.
10. The federal statutes considered were the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and
the Consumer Products Safety Act. The trial court dismissed the claims and the court
of appeals affirmed, finding that the Consumer Product Safety Act did not apply to
food; alcoholic beverages being "food" under the Act. Id. at 243-44.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 244.
13. Id.
14. 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides that:(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it was sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
[Vol. 53
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framework to decide whether strict liability should be imposed on alcoholic
beverage manufacturers.' 8 The Garrison court, relying on comments h, i, and j
of section 402, found that it should not impose liability upon the manufacturer
for failure to warn of the dangerous propensities of alcoholic beverages.' 9
Comment h states that when a product is safe for normal consumption it is not
defective, unless it is foreseeable to a seller that danger may result from a
particular use."0 As the Garrison court pointed out, the "foreseeable use"
qualification in comment h contains caveats in comments j and i." Comment j
uses alcoholic beverages as an example of a product that has effects on health
only when consumed in excessive quantity or over a long period of time." No
warning is required with respect to these products." Comment i, relating to
the consumer expectations test, states that "good whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics. . . ."I" Thus, the Garrison court concluded that under
Illinois law, a manufacturer and distributor of alcohol was not under a duty to
warn consumers because the dangers of the use of alcoholic beverages are
common knowledge. Therefore, the product can't be objectively viewed as un-
reasonably dangerous.' 5
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
18. Garrison, 673 F.2d at 190.
19. Id. at 190-91.
20. Comment h states:
[w]here ... [a seller] has reason to anticipate that danger may result
from a particular use, as where a drug is sold which is safe only in limited
doses, [the seller] may be required to give adequate warning of the danger ...
and a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
21. 673 F.2d at 191.
22. Comment j states:
[A] seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients
in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in ex-
cess quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality
of danger, is generally known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic
beverages are an example ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
23. Id.
24. Comment i states:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good
whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some peo-
ple drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, contain-
ing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1969).
25. Garrison, 673 F.2d at 192. The plaintiffs also argued that there are mis-
1988]
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Pemberton v. American Distilled
Spirits Co. 8 similarly found no duty to warn of danger apparent to the ordi-
nary user. In Pemberton, the decedent's father brought an action against a
grain alcohol retailer, wholesaler, and manufacturer seeking damages for the
death of his minor son caused by the ingestion of Everclear grain alcohol.27
Although the trial court dismissed the action, the court of appeals reversed;
finding cognizable causes of action against the manufacturer for strict liabil-
ity, negligence, and breach of warranty.2 8 The supreme court reversed the
court of appeals, finding that, under the Tennessee version of section 402A,
there was no cause of action because the product was not defective in that it
was not unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the manufacturer's con-
trol.29 Additionally, the court reasoned that because the danger was open and
obvious, there was no duty to warn an occasional inexperienced user.30
Interestingly, the court failed to consider that minors can hardly be con-
sidered occasional users .3 Ignoring this fact, the court concluded that
"[a]lcohol has been present and used in society during all recorded history and
its characteristics and qualities have been fully explored and developed and
are a part of the body of common knowledge. . . ." Therefore, "manufacturers
are entitled to rely upon the common sense and good judgment of
consumers."
32
Several cases granting civil immunity for the absence of warning labels on
alcoholic beverages were decided in 1986. In another Tennessee case, Russell
v. Bishop," plaintiffs sought damages from a distiller for the wrongful death
of their seventeen year old daughter. She died in a car accident with an eigh-
perceptions about the use of alcohol, but the court found that the dangers alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint were not among those misperceptions. Id. at 192 n.6. See gener-
ally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON HEALTH
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH ALCOHOL AND METHODS TO INFORM THE GENERAL PUB-
LIC OF THESE HAZARDS (1980).
26. 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984).
27. Id. at 691.
28. Id. The court of appeals also found causes of action against the retailer and
wholesaler on the basis of breach of warranty. Id.
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id. at 692-93. See also Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d
190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956); Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151
A.2d 731 (1959); Baker v. Stewart Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1961);
Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951). For a
discussion of the application of the "open and obvious danger" rule to minors, see, e.g.,
Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal. App. 3d 135, 229 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1986).
31. Recent surveys indicate the first drinking experience usually occurs around
age 12. Alcohol is the most widely used drug among American youth. NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM, supra note 2.
32. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693 (quoting Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547,
563, 145 S.W. 177, 182 (1912)).
33. No. 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1986) (WESTLAW, 1986 WL 653).
[Vol. 53
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teen year old intoxicated driver who had consumed a pint of Canadian Mist
Whiskey with a friend before the accident.34 The case was one of first impres-
sion in the United States. 35 The court found Pemberton to have set a control-
ling precedent despite an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs' expert in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment.3 6 Basically, the affidavit of the Director of
Traffic Safety Coordinating Committee for Shelby County, Tennessee, who
ran a DWI school, stated that a normal drinker actually has no conception as
to how much alcohol he or she may consume without becoming impaired.37
Plaintiffs' expert went on to voice his approval for placing a warning guideline
for use on alcoholic beverage labels.38
Obviously, the Russell case is quite different from the Abernathy, Garri-
son, and Pemberton cases. Russell involves an alleged duty to warn of the
intoxicating effects of alcohol as to impairment of driving ability, while Aber-
nathy, Garrison, and Pemberton involved consumption as a direct cause of
death. Despite this difference, the Russell court used the section 402A analy-
sis as applied in Pemberton.
A few days after Russell was decided, an Ohio court of appeals ruled in
favor of the distiller in Desatnik v. Lem Motlow, Property, Inc. 39 Desatnik
parallels Abernathy, Garrison, and Pemberton in that the injury directly in-
volved the consumption of alcohol. In Desatnik, a father brought an action
against the manufacturer of Jack Daniel's Whiskey for the death of his minor
son which resulted from acute alcohol poisoning after drinking the manufac-
turer's whiskey. 40 In arguing for the application of strict liability for failure to
warn, plaintiff focused on the fact that the decedent was a minor and an inex-
34. Id. at *1.
35. Note, A Spirited Call to Require Alcohol Manufacturers to Warn of the
Dangerous Propensities of Their Products, 11 NOVA L. REv. 1611, 1616 (1987).
36. Id. at 1617.
37. Russell, 1986 WL 653 at *1.
38. Id. at *5. The expert suggested the following to be put on labels:
DID YOU KNOW
1. That you are presumed to be under the influence of Intoxicating li-
quor If your Blood Alcohol Concentration Is .10 percent by weight or more at
the time of your offense.
2. That the Chemical Analysis of your blood or breath regardless of the
reading is admissable as evidence in court.
3. That refusal to submit to chemical breath or blood test upon arrest
will result in revocation of your license for a period of six months.
DON'T DRIVE DRUNK
1. Report suspected drunk drivers to police immediately
2. If you are over the limit let someone sober drive
3. Don't mix excessive Drinking with Driving
GET THE DRUNK DRIVER OFF THE ROAD FOR HIS SAKE AND
YOURS
Id.
39. Desatnik v. Lem Motlow, Prop., Inc., No. 84 C.A. 104 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan 9,
1986) (WESTLAW, 1986 WL 760).
40. Id. at *I.
1988]
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perienced drinker and as such was not in the class of persons to whom such
risks are commonly known.4 1 The court, however, applied a strict interpreta-
tion of section 402A, comment i, stating that the risks of alcohol ingestion are
generally known, obviating any duty to warn.42 Further, the court found no
duty to warn under a negligence theory because the harm was caused by a
product intended for human consumption rather than by a product not in-
tended for consumption.43 The court also found that "bad whiskey," with
which there would be a duty to warn under comment i, meant whiskey having
a manufacturing defect rendering it unusually toxic as opposed to "bad whis-
key" meaning whiskey of inferior quality." Thus, the court found no duty to
warn.
The Iowa Supreme Court addressed the same issue as the Russell court
in the 1986 case Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co.45 In Maguire, the plaintiff was
seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident with a driver who was intoxicated
as a result of drinking Pabst beer.46 The complaint alleged manufacturer lia-
bility for, among other theories, strict liability under section 402A.'7 Plaintiffs
argued that persons cannot be expected to know their limits of beverage con-
sumption without an adequate warning by the manufacturer as to the effects
of various quantities of beer.' 8 In upholding the trial courts dismissal, the
court stated that it would be impractical to warn of particular tolerances of
each consumer. 49
Similarly, in the 1987 Texas court of appeals case, Morris v. Adolph
Coors Co.,50 plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident brought an action
against the manufacturers of Coors beer under theories of strict products lia-
bility, negligence, violation of statutory prohibition of deceptive advertising,
violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Code and breach of express or implied
warranties.5 ' The manufacturer's beer was allegedly consumed by an eighteen
year old driver who had become intoxicated at a high school party before the
41. Id. at *3.
42. Id. at *4.
43. Id. at *3-4. Surprisingly, the court found no duty to warn, even to minors,
who might not generally know of the dangers of consumption of alcohol, but agreed
with cases which found a duty to warn adults as well as children of generally known
dangers of products (furniture polish, medical burning alcohol) not intended for human
consumption. See, e.g., Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prod., 555 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1977)(prison inmates drinking medical burning alcohol); Spruill v. Boyle Midway, Inc., 308
F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (child swallowing furniture polish).
44. Desatnik, 1986 WL 760 at *2. The court states that its interpretation is the
"clear meaning" of comment i. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
45. 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986).
46. Id. at 566.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 570.
49. Id.
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automobile collision.5 2 Plaintiffs argued that the present social conditions and
changes in circumstances in recent years regarding drunk drivers require that
beer manufactures must undertake the duty to warn the public of the dangers
of drunk driving.5 3 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for failure to
state a cause of action. 4 Applying the defective, unreasonably dangerous test,
the court held that the beer was not defective because it was safe for normal
handling and consumption.5 5 The court further stated that the ordinary con-
sumer understands that over-consumption of an alcoholic beverage may impair
driving ability. 56 The court also found that there was not an implied civil rem-
edy in the Texas statutory prohibition on deceptive advertising or the Alco-
holic Beverage Code for claims against manufacturers. 57 Finally, the court
found no express warranty and no breach of any implied warranty.58
III. THE Hon CASE
Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.59 was the first case to hold that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether alcoholic beverages were safe for their
intended purpose without a warning, thus precluding summary judgment
under Pennsylvania law. In Hon, Nancy Hon sought recovery for the death of
her husband, who died at age twenty-six from pancreatitis caused by the con-
sumption of alcohol.60 Evidence of Mr. Hon's drinking habits for the past six
years suggested that Mr. Hon consumed two to three cans of Old Milwaukee
Beer and Old Milwaukee Light Beer per night.6 1 The trial court granted
Stroh's motion for summary judgment.62 In opposition to the motion, one of
plaintiff's experts, a toxicologist and pharmacologist, submitted an affidavit
stating that Mr. Hon's drinking caused his pancreatitis. 63 Additionally, the
expert stated that the general public's understanding is that only excessive and
prolonged use of alcoholic beverages is likely to result in disease. The expert
asserted that this view is contrary to new evidence in the medical community
suggesting that moderate use of alcohol, as in the case of Mr. Hon, may result
in many types of diseases, not simply liver disease.6 4 Plaintiff's other expert, a
medical doctor, submitted an affidavit stating that medical literature supports
the contention that even small amounts of alcohol taken during a brief period
52. Id. at 581.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 582.
56. Id. at 583-84.
57. Id. at 586-87.
58. Id. at 587.
59. 835 F.2d 510 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 511. Old Milwaukee and Old Milwaukee Light Beer are manufactured
by Stroh Brewery.
62. Id. at 510.
63. Id. at 511.
64. Id. at 511 n.2.
1988]
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may be lethal.6 5
As in the cases discussed previously, the Hon court analyzed the case
under section 402A.66 Under Pennsylvania law, the trial judge decides, as a
matter of law, whether the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous
using a risk versus utility analysis based upon the social policy considerations
underlying strict liability.67 If the case goes to the jury, the jury will only
consider the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, the judge having already de-
cided that strict liability applies. 68 Further, under Pennsylvania law a plaintiff
must prove that the product was defective when it left the hands of the manu-
facturer and the defect proximately caused the injury.6 9
The court reasoned that a product may be defective not only because of a
faulty design or a manufacturing flaw, but also because it lacks warnings or
instructions which are needed to make the product safe for its intended pur-
pose.70 As in the cases discussed previously, the Hon court stated that liability
only arises for dangers not generally known.71
The court noted that in actions alleging inadequate warnings, the "thresh-
old" social policy considerations under Pennsylvania law are relatively simple.
A warning requirement does not detract from a products' utility, and the small
cost of adding a warning almost always outweighs the risk of harm. 2 Both
parties, however, argued over the feasibility of a warning. The trial court sug-
gested that allowing strict liability in this case could impose an impractical
burden on manufacturers of alcoholic beverages. Mrs. Hon argued that the
warning, "Alcohol can have adverse effects on your health even when con-
sumed in moderate amounts" would suffice.7 3 The court of appeals decided
that this issue would benefit from a more fully developed record and remanded
the claim.7 4
Next, the court addressed whether a warning was necessary for Stroh's
beer to be safe for human consumption.7 5 Under Pennsylvania law, if there is
a factual basis for finding that such a warning would be necessary, the jury
65. Id. at 511.
66. Id. at 512.
67. Id.
68. Id. See also, e.g., Holloway v. J.B. Sys., 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979); Az-
zarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkbile v. Brantly
Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (plurality opinion).
69. Id. Stroh did not argue absence of proximate cause at trial, so it was not
preserved for appeal. Id. at 513 n.3.
70. Id. at 513. See, e.g., Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); Berkbile, 462 Pa. at 100, 337 A.2d at 902;
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287, 282 A.2d 206, 219 (1971).
71. Id.
72. Id. See, e.g., Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 541, 391 A.2d at 1023; Dambacher v.
Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, -, 485 A.2d 408, 423 (1984) (en banc).
73. Id. at 513-14.
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decides the question.76 The appellate court held that the trial court erred in
holding, as a matter of law, that Mr. Hon knew or should have known that the
amount of beer he consumed was potentially deadly.77 This, the court stated, is
a question for the jury.78
The Hon court found no evidence on the record that the general public
knows moderate consumption can be lethal.7 9 In addition, the court concluded
that a jury could find that Stroh's marketing and advertising strategy aided
the dangerous consumption of beer by promoting that moderate consumption
is "part of the 'good life' " and is associated with "healthy, robust activities."'80
The court noted that it was unimportant whether Mr. Hon relied on the adver-
tisements; the proper standard to be used is the advertisements' effects on the
general public.81
A major difference between Hon and the other cases discussed is the
court's reluctance to give a strict reading of section 402A comment j.82 Stroh's
argued that comment j means "that 'the dangers of the prolonged consump--
tion of alcohol are well known to the public.' "83 The court rejected this argu-
ment, stating that when the dangers of alcohol are generally known, then no
warning is required; comment j does not suggest that all dangers of consump-
tion are generally known and a warning might be required for those dangers.84
The court saw no basis for predicting that Pennsylvania courts would treat
alcohol any differently than they treat any other drugs; when there are
hazards of which the average consumer has no knowledge, the manufacturer
must provide the necessary warnings.8 5 The court then vacated the summary
judgment and remanded the case to the district court.88
This is not to say that the Hon court would have decided the cases dis-
cussed previously in this Note any differently. The court stated that those
cases, with the possible exception of Garrison, involved situations were the
consumer knew or should have known that his or her consumption of alcohol





80. Id. at 514-15.
81. Id. at 514 n.4.
82. Id. at 515. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 515 (quoting Appellee's Brief at 20).
84. Id. The court also notes that comment i uses alcohol as an example of an
exception to liability only because the dangers of intoxication and alcoholism are within
the general knowledge of the ordinary consumer. Id. at 515-16 n.6.
85. Id. at 516.
86. Id. at 517.
87. Id. The court considered Rohe v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 732 F.2d 155 (6th
Cir. 1984); Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982); Maquire v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986); Desatnik v. Lem Motlow, Prop., Inc., No.
84 C.A. 104 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan 9, 1986) (WESTLAW, 1986 WL 760); Pemberton v.
American Distilled Spirits Co., 644 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984); Russell v. Bishop, No.
1988]
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sumption in the same quantity and manner as that of Mr. Hon.88
IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike manufacturers of prescription drugs,89 over the counter drugs,90
and other potentially dangerous products intended for human consumption,
alcoholic beverage producers have not been required to put warning labels on
their products because the dangers of alcohol are generally known. 91 Hon is
the first case that changes this overwhelming precedent.
Alcoholic beverages are a legally unique product. Cigarettes, another
commonly used product with known adverse health effects, are required to
have federally mandated labels warning of their danger. 2 Despite these feder-
ally mandated warning labels, cigarette manufacturers are often forced into
litigation concerning the label's adequacy.93 No plaintiff, however, has pre-
vailed in cigarette litigation. These common law claims are impliedly pre-
empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.94 While most
courts hold that this Act does not expressly preempt common law claims, it
contains no "savings clause" which expressly allows common law claims based
on a failure to warn. 5 Thus, if Congress were to pass legislation requiring that
a particular warning label be placed on alcoholic beverages, as it did with
cigarettes, then the issue in alcoholic beverages cases would change from
whether dangers of consuming liquor are generally known to the issue of
whether common law claims are preempted. Should Congress decide to in-
clude a "savings clause" in their legislation, thereby preserving common law
88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1986) (WESTLAW, 1986 WL 653); Morris v. Adolph
Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987). The court found the result in Garri-
son not surprising because a court could reasonably infer that the consumption of
vodka over a 20 year period is "excessive." Id. at 516 n.7. However, the Hon court
states that Garrison does not stand for the proposition that any danger caused by the
prolonged consumption of alcohol can be considered common knowledge. Id. The court
also noted that Stroh's did not argue that it was protected from strict liability on the
basis of compliance with federal laws pertaining to advertising and labeling, as was
argued in Abernathy, supra note 7. Therefore, the court did not address the issue. 835
F.2d at 517 n.9.
88. Id. at 517.
89. See, e.g., Peterson v. Park Davis & Co., 705 P.2d 1001 (Colo. App. 1985);
Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
90. See, e.g., Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d
132 (1978).
91. For a criticism of this reasoning, see generally Note, A Spirited Call to Re-
quire Alcohol Manufacturers to Warn of the Dangerous Propensities of Their Prod-
ucts, 11 NOVA L. REV. 1611 (1987).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1340 (1965).
93. See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 907
(1987); Roysdon v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, supra note 92.
[Vol. 53
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tort claims, then plaintiffs will have a greater chance to recover in strict
liability.
Until Congress passes such a labeling requirement, however, the issue in
alcoholic beverage product liability cases will remain whether such dangers
were generally known. At the very least, the Hon case has opened the door for
recovery in strict liability for plaintiffs harmed in a way not commonly known
by the general public. It is likely that more courts will give a less strict inter-
pretation of comments h, i, and j of section 402A, allowing more of these cases
to go to the jury.
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